Our troops occupied advantageous positions and destroyed the enemy as if at a shooting range. Enemy losses were 17–25 times greater than ours. But then someone decided the line on the map wasn't neat enough, and the endless orders began: "straighten the line," "retake the previously lost positions."
The result was losses that were impossible to justify, with two consequences. First, the casualty ratio dropped to only three to one. Second, our infantry was often too small in number and disoriented, allowing the enemy to break through not only the "retaken positions" but also the previously stable defensive line where they had earlier failed again and again despite enormous losses. This is how we lost an enormous number of people—so many that, had they been preserved, there would have been far less need for new mobilization.
The second recurring pattern was the rotations in 2023–2024. During these rotations, the enemy struck newly arrived units and broke through. These constant rotations to patch holes elsewhere, with breakthroughs as the inevitable consequence, were also characteristic of Syrskyi's style.
Any other army in the same situation would have assigned sectors of responsibility to large formations—divisions, corps, armies—and reinforced them with fresh battalions. Instead, we saw the constant creation of new units and endless crisis micromanagement instead of an overall strategy.
By 2025–2026, this entire Syrskyi-style way of fighting had become impossible because of drones. Yet attempts to continue fighting this way have not stopped. Fighting through unjustified losses and constant micromanagement without sustained support has simply become a habit. If earlier this approach cost us Ocheretyne, now it is Siversk. The strategy remains the same: weaken our own forces and allow the enemy to gain the advantage.
Anyone would have replaced General Syrskyi long ago with someone more capable. Anyone would also have sought the advice of a trusted military adviser instead of reacting emotionally and trying to command military professionals directly.
At the end of 1942, Stalin recognized the brilliance of General Antonov, whose phenomenal memory impressed him, and made him his principal adviser. It was precisely because Stalin listened to Antonov that the victories which followed became possible. Antonov also had the courage to tell Stalin the truth in private, although after the war Stalin's pride resurfaced, and he sent Antonov away to the provinces in 1948.
Churchill and Roosevelt tested generals and replaced them until they found commanders who did not merely fight, but who won. Once they found winners, they tolerated them despite all their eccentricities.
Today, in the era of drone warfare, we objectively need a different kind of war than the one fought under Syrskyi and Zelenskyy in previous years. We need a different team of generals capable of winning the war that is being fought today, because Syrskyi's methods lead toward defeat once the enemy completes its mobilization. And we must have the patience to trust new generals instead of interfering with their command.
Right now everything feels hopeless, but we continue doing everything we can to save the lives of the Warriors of Light. They urgently need:
🔹 Typhoon Sierra shotguns — 30,456 UAH each, 4 still needed!
🔹 Holosun thermal super-collimators — 89,640 UAH each. There are requests for 9 of them!
🔹 Shotgun ammunition — 6,760 UAH per box of 250 rounds. The requests are endless!
🔹 Typhoon Quake shotguns — 26,300 UAH each. There are already requests for at least 8 of them!
Please help—every donation will be matched by our Ukrainian sponsors!!!