Four long years of experience: how sniper warfare — and our support for snipers — has changed.
In just one more month, the great russian-Ukrainian war will have lasted as long as the First World War. It was in the furnace of World War I that mass professional sniping was born. During the Russian-Ukrainian war, sniper warfare has undergone its greatest transformation yet — and these changes must be understood again and again.
These days also mark four years since we began helping snipers. By then I could no longer fight myself, and countless requests from the front forced me to begin the work of providing grassroots support to units close to my heart.
During the first months, starting in May 2022, we helped with ammunition, vehicles, rifles, optics, suppressors — we provided whatever the guys asked for.
But even at that early stage, we began concentrating on .338 caliber rifles, mainly Rugers and Savages as affordable but high-quality weapons. We refined every rifle to near perfection, increasing effective range by up to 500 meters. Starting in autumn, we switched to providing only high-quality optics. This created strange situations where snipers would ask for a .308 bolt-action rifle, and we would answer:
“You’ll outgrow it in a few months — let’s give you a .338 Ruger immediately, with optics, suppressor, bipod, ammunition reserve, and guaranteed replenishment if needed.”
At the same time, we established a system for evaluating sniper skills and personal qualities. Weapons were given only to those who fought constantly and delivered real results.
By the summer of the first year of the war, we began forming groups of 6–8 elite snipers and prioritizing their full support above all else.
Soon these sniper groups were reinforced with reconnaissance troops for cover and joint operations, drone operators for reconnaissance and protection, sappers, and professional saboteurs.
The period from summer 2022 to summer 2023 became the golden age of our work. We saw real results from every new sniper group and every reinforcement effort. The enemy genuinely feared sniper group fire, because it was devastatingly effective almost every time.
Beginning in autumn 2023, Ukrainian snipers started suffering serious losses — especially those operating outside our specialized autonomous groups. We began implementing measures designed to reduce casualties and restore snipers’ ability to systematically eliminate the enemy.
During this period, we began systematically purchasing .375, .408, and .416 caliber rifles capable of striking targets at much greater distances. Every additional 500 meters increased sniper survivability tenfold. These calibers fully justified themselves. High-quality ammunition became absolutely essential to their effectiveness. We supplied such ammunition not only to snipers who received these rifles from us, but also to many other elite professionals.
As the front became more porous and enemy groups began penetrating deeper into our rear areas, we devoted significant attention to strengthening sniper group protection against enemy infantry actions.
Since autumn 2024, we have not initiated the creation of a single new sniper group. Instead, we focused only on upgrading existing groups, changing their tactics, and redefining the missions they could realistically perform.
The battlefield situation changed radically every two months, so there is no point listing every challenge. But there is a reason we sharply reduced purchases of new long-range sniper rifles — all new investments of this type are now made only as rare exceptions.
In general, we focused on several priorities:
- replacing damaged weapons,- adding critical equipment to sniper groups,
- continuously improving anti-drone protection,
- maintaining supplies of high-quality ammunition,
- providing additional equipment for effective night operations.
We also minimized support for training new snipers and designated marksmen — such assistance became rare exceptions.
We now provide “super-weapons” less and less often, not only because of reduced introduction of new snipers or limits on forming new groups. Increasingly, a new elite professional receives equipment from a highly intelligent sniper transferring into long-range drone operations, while we simply modernize the sniper system and add individually necessary equipment.
Because we paid close attention to battlefield changes from Easter 2024 until today, the snipers under our care suffered the minimum possible losses. At the same time, the intensity of enemy eliminations fell by only half compared to spring 2024.
Today many people openly doubt whether snipers can operate effectively at all. Our sniper groups continue working only because they concentrate on narrow sectors of the front where such work is still possible.
Over the last year, this has mainly meant several types of sniper activity.
First — supporting assault operations in urban combat. This proved highly effective, especially in Kupiansk and Stepnohirsk.
Second — neutralizing enemy groups attempting to operate in our rear areas.
Third — eliminating enemy sabotage groups on their own territory.
All these missions require close integration with drone operators. Often snipers must finish what drones started — especially during urban assaults. Sometimes a silent elimination is needed against enemies infiltrating our rear, and around 70% of such operations happen in coordination with drone operators. And sometimes a sniper can make a shot where enemy EW systems have already brought down ten of our drones.
Classical “free hunting” as a fourth category of sniper work survives only among the very best sniper groups armed with unique .375, .416, .50, and .408 caliber rifles. These are the groups we prioritize above all others, because this is now the era when they quietly set new records.
If a group has suitable rifles but lacks elite professionals, results will be minimal. If there are only a few super-professionals, even people like Kovalskyi, but the group overall is weak — results will still remain limited.
Faith in sniper warfare survives only in those groups successfully carrying out these four tasks while being maximally trained and maximally supplied. Everyone else — those thrown randomly into battle, those outside elite groups, those under commanders who do not understand sniper warfare — either try to transfer into competent units or lose faith in continuing as snipers.
Today we support only those sniper groups that remain complex living systems still capable of operating under modern conditions — and which retain enough freedom from command to operate where they can realistically survive and remain effective.
We support only those groups that understand their role on the battlefield and do not recklessly sacrifice themselves.
We support only those groups that still believe in their ability to function as snipers — and prove it in practice.
Will there come a day when supporting snipers no longer makes sense at all? Perhaps. We are already preparing for such a possibility by eliminating needs that are weak links today — or will certainly become weak links tomorrow.
It may ultimately be better to invest more into anti-drone protection for ordinary soldiers fighting alongside snipers, evacuation teams, and everyone sustaining the defense near the front.
But there is one important possibility: brilliant engineers and inventors may yet discover ways to neutralize drones so effectively that even armored columns — not just snipers — fully return to the battlefield. In fact, some extremely intelligent snipers already spend their free time working on innovations that could radically transform the battlefield once again.
In any case, we still have work to do — saving lives and bringing Victory closer.
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