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Snipers can only work effectively where a support system exists


If your brigade does not fight like special operations forces, there is no point in trying to revive sniping within it.

I said this harsh truth yesterday — but this is the law of modern warfare. In the past, you could create an island of elite professionalism, and it could still function in an ocean of chaos. Today, that is no longer enough.

Today, it is not enough to invest money into sniper equipment, or time and effort into training a sniper team. What matters now is that the sniper team is fully integrated into the larger system of the unit — and that this system itself operates at the highest standards of modern warfare.

Not long ago, snipers were being actively reassigned and concentrated in places where they could function as part of a system — where they would be supported in everything from drone operators to medical evacuation if wounded. Those who failed to transfer before the de facto restrictions now regret it and are looking for a way out.

Last year, we agreed — under persuasion from one brigade’s command — to support a project aimed at reviving sniping within that brigade. We had worked closely with them in 2022–2023, and their people were highly capable and well-trained.

Nearly a year has passed. The results are, frankly, minimal — despite the brigade fighting intensively on a very hot axis. Why?

In reality, the brigade’s overall level of professionalism has critically declined over the past two years. “We fight like territorial defense — it’s painful to watch,” as one honest officer put it. This assessment is fully confirmed by special operations groups trying to operate within the brigade’s area of responsibility.

Therefore, before thinking about the next stage of sniper development in the Armed Forces, we must first turn our most capable brigades into division-level formations (formally or in practice), including by reallocating personnel and equipment from units that do not function as systems to those ready for modern war.

Next, we must study how snipers are employed in the Alpha SBU and the GUR, and understand the extremely high technological and professional level at which sniper teams operate as part of a broader ecosystem of elite specialists.

If such an ecosystem exists at the unit level, sniper teams have a chance to survive and be effective. If it does not — there is no point in even trying. Snipers simply will not have the conditions to survive.

Likewise, if you cannot provide a sniper team with full, direct support — it is better to invest resources elsewhere.

Today, snipers can only work effectively where a support system exists — both at the overall unit level and in direct battlefield coordination. Whether it is a brigade, an assault regiment, or a composite unit with comprehensive support — results are always strong.

Only when there is real support from the entire unit can we talk about developing sniping. And by “support,” I do not mean intent — I mean a system capable of fully sustaining a sniper team as a battlefield element.

And if the units fighting alongside the snipers directly support them — then development is possible. Because if a sniper team is ready and willing to support assault operations, but in a crisis is simply abandoned — then they might as well switch to drone operations, where their intelligence and skills are also in demand.

When a unit and its fighters operate in full coordination with sniper teams, only then does it make sense to focus on supplying those teams with weapons, ammunition, and gear. This is where we, as volunteers, can truly make a difference.

Supporting a sniper team that is fully integrated into a system makes sense. That is where we must step in — enhancing their survivability and their effectiveness.

There are still cases of outdated thinking: “Let’s equip sniper teams for tactics that worked in 2024 or earlier and hope for results.” If the snipers survive under such an approach — that’s already good. If they haven’t been forced to turn in expensive .375 rifles and equipment — even better.

In 2024, operating at a “4 out of 5” level could be enough. Today, everything must perform at a “5+” level just to achieve a successful shot.

We provide for true professionals who want to continue fighting as snipers exactly this: the ability to operate at the highest global standards — not “good enough” or “it used to work.”

Does it make sense to equip newcomers — even the best-trained ones — with world-class competition-grade gear? Not always. Even among experienced fighters we won't support everyone.

The Defense Forces must ensure a level of overall professionalism that allows sniper teams to function and survive. This must be a reliable system with clearly defined roles for snipers.

The search for a “silver bullet” to increase sniper effectiveness is a dead end.

At the level of equipment and tools, there are no universal solutions. Every team of elite professionals is like world-class artists — each requires something unique. There can be no standard approach.

What the state could and should have done long ago is increase financial support for the best units. Even Stalin paid his elite units double. Overall support for Defense Forces personnel must be significantly increased — and top professionals must be paid accordingly.

Among other things, so they do not have to ask for bullets or fuel.

These steps would matter far more than anything else. They would allow volunteers to focus on what truly matters.

Because if instead of sourcing high-end ammunition for elite teams I spend months buying shotguns and 12-gauge cartridges — while the system provides broken-down equipment and minimal ammo — then this is a verdict. This is treating fighters as disposable.

Fix these systemic issues — and we will solve all the unique problems of elite professionals. That is my vision.


Realistically, what will we do next?

We will focus on protecting lives. On systematic, targeted support for elite professionals — both for their protection and their ability to hit the enemy.

We have abandoned the idea of creating new sniper teams or rebuilding sniping in unprepared units. It is inefficient, and we simply do not have the resources.

Our focus is to preserve and support those who already deliver results. That is our planning horizon — and where we are effective.


I am grateful to everyone who supports us.

Most of all — for every life saved. Because human life is an infinite value, and saving it must always be our priority.

That is why we also support drone operators and medevac — because saving lives is sacred. It is priority number one.

I am also grateful for every effective shot — because it means more of our defenders stay alive.


We are #TeamYuri — and we save lives.

If our work ever stops saving lives — we will immediately stop supporting snipers.

But for now, every day proves how critically important our efforts are.

Every day I receive messages: “Today was a nightmare, but we survived thanks to you — because you provided what we needed. Thank you, Palych.”

We work for those messages — for the concrete proof that something we did helped someone survive.

Because we treat these men and women like our own children. And we cannot do otherwise.

Dear friends, join #TeamYuri in supporting the best snipers of Ukraine — and the entire free world.

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